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Since the post-Cold War period, democratic governance and
increased respect for human rights have been an important
objective of the international community and in particular of
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD). In this context, political condi-
tionality – most often in the form of aid sanctions or suspen-
sions – became one of the key instruments in pursuing issues of
political governance in developing, and often aid-dependent,
countries (Crawford, 2001). Given that development policy
constituted the main linkage and driver of the relationship
between the developed and the developing world, the concept
of political conditionality has, for a long time, mainly been
linked to the ﬁeld of foreign aid. This focus on political condi-
tionality in foreign aid has at least partly neglected the fact
that political conditionality has played a role in other external
policies for quite some time, such as trade policy in the case of
the US (Carnegie, 2013; Hafner-Burton, 2009), or started to
become increasingly important in other policy ﬁelds over the
last decade, as in the case of the EU (Orbie, 2008; Smith,
1998).
Moreover, the fundamental shifts in the relationship between
the West and developing countries during the last decade have
direct implications for the concept of political conditionality.
Many developing economies have grown signiﬁcantly and
graduated from low-income to middle-income status. As coun-
tries grow richer in per capita terms, foreign aid typically
accounts for a very limited share of gross domestic product
(GDP) (Carbonnier & Sumner, 2012). These patterns of “shift-
ing wealth” (OECD, 2010) have altered the international land-
scape and made distinctions such as “North” and “South,”
“donor” and “recipient,” and asymmetric “dependency” rela-
tionships increasingly redundant (Carbone, 2013; Harris,
Moore, & Schmitz, 2009). Other external policies – such as
trade and investment, climate, and energy, as well as foreign
and security policy – have also gained in importance in the
West’s relations with the developing world and broadened
the strategic importance from poverty reduction to internation-
al cooperation for the provision of global public goods (Koch,
2012). In addition, non-Western donors, in particular China,
increasingly oﬀer developing countries alternative trade,97investment and aid packages with little political strings
attached and thus increasingly challenge the use of political
conditionality by Western donors in development cooperation
(Huliaras & Magliveras, 2008; Kaya, 2014). In this changing
international landscape, tying political conditionality mainly
to aid will have little traction and not provide suﬃcient lever-
age due to the decreasing importance of the policy ﬁeld, the
declining aid dependence of most developing countries and
the emergence of new non-Western donors.
In the future, leverage across diﬀerent external policies will
have to become the central source of inﬂuence if Western
countries continue to emphasize normative approaches in their
external relations, aiming to promote democratic development
and respect for human rights. Stronger diplomatic engagement
will have to be aligned with other areas of external action, so
that incentives or sanctions across aid, trade, investment, eco-
nomic, security, energy, and other ﬁelds enhance each other.
This requires ﬁnding “more innovative ways. . . of intersecting
incentives and pressure between the ‘silos’ of diﬀerent policy
domains.” (Youngs, 2010, p. 11).
This paper argues that the decreasing importance of aid –
and the increasing importance of other external policies –
requires a new research agenda on political conditionality that
(i) studies the various sources and inﬂuence mechanisms of dif-
ferent political conditionality instruments “beyond aid” and
(ii) analyzes these instruments more holistically, with a focus
on the relationship and the interaction between diﬀerent poli-
tical conditionality instruments.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it sets out to ask how
political conditionality can be conceptualized across diﬀerent
policy ﬁelds: What are the main leverage mechanisms we need
to be aware of when studying political conditionality “beyond
aid”? In answering this question, I aim to contribute to
addressing the theoretical gap in the existing literature by con-
ceptualizing the varied conditionality mechanisms across dif-
ferent policy ﬁelds in an ideal–typical typology. I then use
the example of the European Union 1 (EU) – a supranational
institution with a strong emphasis on the promotion of democ-
racy and human rights and extensive experience in applying
political conditionalities – to further develop the typology by
applying it to the existing conditionality mechanisms in diﬀer-
ent external policies of the EU. The second contribution of the
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ments of a new research agenda on political conditionality. To
this end, I apply the typology to the literature on EU political
conditionality to draw attention to the main themes as well as
understudied areas within the existing research. The added
value of the literature review is not its comprehensiveness
but rather its synthesized analysis of diﬀerent strands of
research on political conditionality and its focus on the need
to (i) transfer lessons from one strand of research to the
others, and (ii) to study diﬀerent political conditionality
instruments concurrently.
The paper starts oﬀ with a conceptual discussion of political
conditionality, leading to the development of a typology that
identiﬁes four diﬀerent ideal–typical mechanisms of political
conditionality. In the third part, the typology is applied to
the case of the EU and an optimized, reﬁned typology is pre-
sented. The fourth part applies the reﬁned typology to diﬀer-
ent strands of research on EU political conditionality to
identify research gaps. The last section concludes and high-
lights elements of a future research agenda on political condi-
tionality “beyond aid.”2. A TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY
Political conditionality is a complex phenomenon and no
consensual, widely shared deﬁnition exists among political
and social scientists, economists, or legal scholars. The con-
cept of the “ﬁrst generation of political conditionality” (see
Molenaers, Dellepiane, & Faust, 2015) emerged in the post-
Cold War period. At the time, it referred mainly to negative
measures in the ﬁeld of development. In this vein, Stokke
(1995) deﬁned political conditionality as: “the use of pressure,
by the donor government, in terms of threatening to terminate
aid, or actually terminating or reducing it, if conditions are not
met by the recipient” (Stokke, 1995, p. 12). This focus on
negative measures in deﬁning and conceptualizing political
conditionality has also resulted in “an automatic reﬂex to
identify conditionality with sanctions” (Fierro, 2003, p. 99).
This traditional understanding of political conditionality is
not only becoming less and less appropriate for capturing
the full toolbox and various characteristics and leverage
mechanisms applied by aid donors to incentivize political
reforms. As an approach, it is also too limited to capture the
increasing diversiﬁcation and use of political conditionality
in policy ﬁelds other than foreign aid. Diversiﬁcation, in this
sense, relates to (i) the diﬀerent types and incentive mechan-
isms of political conditionality in diﬀerent policy ﬁelds. Nowa-
days, political conditionality goes beyond the use of classic
tools of enforcement such as sanctions and encompasses posi-
tive as well as negative measures across diﬀerent external poli-
cies. Trade, foreign, security, climate, and energy policy have
become increasingly important in the West’s relationship
and cooperation with developing countries, and they include
political conditionalities to varying degrees. (ii) The second
aspect of diversiﬁcation of political conditionality relates to
the changing objectives that are pursued with the instrument.
Traditionally, political conditionality in foreign aid has been
used and conceptualized mainly with a “narrow” and
minimalist view on democratic development and the so-called
ﬁrst generation of human rights, that is, political and civil
rights (see e.g., Diamond, 1999; Tomasevski, 1997). Accord-
ingly, research largely focused on the use of conditionality in
cases of election irregularities, coup d’e´tats, and restrictions
of political and civil liberties (see e.g., Crawford, 2001;
Stokke, 1995). Although democratic reform and politicaland civil rights remain important for the use of political con-
ditionality, the second generation of human rights (social and
economic rights) and elements of the third generation of
human rights (environmental rights 2) have become increasing-
ly relevant against the background of intensifying globaliza-
tion. In trade policy, for example, political conditionality
mainly aims at ensuring compliance with international labor
standards and, more recently, also aims at inﬂuencing the sus-
tainable development of trade partners (Hafner-Burton, 2009;
Orbie, 2011; Orbie & Tortell, 2009).
Some therefore argue that questions of how to conceptualize
and theorize political conditionality have gained renewed rele-
vance in the context of accelerating globalization and more
connected and intertwined markets and people (Blanchard &
Ripsman, 2013). In this view, higher interconnectivity and
interdependence also lead to higher public and political inter-
est in inﬂuencing other countries’ domestic political processes
and human rights performance (Blanchard & Ripsman, 2013).
Studying this diversiﬁcation of political conditionality
beyond aid requires a broadening of the concept and deﬁnition
of the term as well as a broadening of the research rationale. It
also requires a conceptual understanding of political condi-
tionality that is applicable across diﬀerent policy ﬁelds and
accommodates diﬀerent incentive mechanisms for diﬀerent
political objectives.
International relations research and theory provide impor-
tant guidance in this respect. From an international relations
viewpoint, conditionality is considered a mechanism through
which states and international institutions aim at inﬂuencing
the behavior of other states by using material incentives. As
a concept, conditionality is closely linked to a rational choice
logic that deﬁnes actors as cost–beneﬁt calculators and strate-
gic utility-maximizers (Kelley, 2004). Building on a logic of
consequentialism, international institutions and states aim to
change the behavior of other states not by inﬂuencing their
preferences but rather by inﬂuencing their cost–beneﬁt calcula-
tion. The extent to which conditionality can be considered a
mechanism of coercion is disputed. Those who focus mostly
on negative conditionality either consider the use of material
incentives as a key instrument of coercion (see e.g., Dobbin,
Simmons, & Garrett, 2007; Goodman & Jinks, 2004;
Weyland, 2005), or they diﬀerentiate mechanisms of coercion,
highlighting the diﬀerence between the use of physical (mili-
tary) force and material incentives (see e.g., Magen, Risse,
McFaul, & Lehmkuhl, 2009). Those who include positive con-
ditionality in their conceptualization of conditionality high-
light the fact that conditionality can constitute an invitation
to voluntary adaptation and mechanisms of “reinforcement
by reward” (Schimmelfennig, Engert, & Knobel, 2003).
What is clear, however, is that conditionality diﬀers from a
broader set of means of international inﬂuence generally sub-
sumed under socialization. 3 The main diﬀerence between
socialization and conditionality is the use of material (positive
and negative) incentives in the latter case and the reliance on
“the logic of appropriateness” (March & Olsen, 1998) in the
former: “The deﬁning feature is that external actors do not
link any concrete incentives to behavior but rely solely on
the use of norms to either persuade, shame, or praise actors
into changing their policies” (Kelley, 2004, p. 428). In the case
of conditionality, external incentives are expected to be able to
change the utility calculations of actors by raising the costs of
non-compliance or by oﬀering additional beneﬁts in order to
change cost–beneﬁt calculations (Risse & Bo¨rzel, 2012;
Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). Changing the behavior
of states, rather than their beliefs or preferences as in the
case of socialization, is considered the ultimate goal of
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1999; Tallberg, 2002a).
In the broadest terms, conditionality thus describes an
incentive instrument in the relationship between two actors,
in which one actor aims at changing the behavior of the other
by setting up conditions for the relationship and by manipulat-
ing its cost–beneﬁt calculation by using (positive and negative)
material incentives. In the case of political conditionality, the
behavior that is sought to be changed relates to democratic
development and the protection and promotion of all three
generations of human rights. In order to capture this deﬁnition
conceptually – and to provide a structured overview of the
varied types of political conditionality and their diﬀerent lever-
age mechanisms – I develop a simple ideal–typical typology of
political conditionality along two dimensions.
The aim of the typology is to capture and distinguish the dif-
ferent mechanisms potentially at play in diﬀerent external poli-
cies. Empirically, it is possible that diﬀerent mechanisms are
combined by the conditionality actor and that conditionality
recipients are faced with varying obligations and diﬀerent
types of political conditionality at the same time. It is also pos-
sible that political conditionality is applied in one policy ﬁeld
but not in another (e.g., trade sanctions are imposed on a
country but aid continues to ﬂow or vice versa). The typology
thus aims to provide researchers with an idea of the diﬀerent
kinds of mechanisms that exist in diﬀerent external policies
and that need to be considered to study the existence and
interplay of various sources of inﬂuence potentially at play.
The ﬁrst dimension of the typology relates to an ex-ante
mechanism of conditionality: If conditions need to be fulﬁlled
before entering into a relationship, a speciﬁc form of coop-
eration or before reaping the beneﬁts of a beneﬁcial agree-
ment, it is commonly referred to as ex-ante conditionality
(see e.g., Checkel, 2000; Fierro, 2003). The interest of the
conditionality recipient in receiving the beneﬁt is used by the
conditionality actor as a lever for desired behavior change.
Ex-post conditionality, on the other hand, refers to conditions
that are set during the course of an ongoing (contractual) rela-
tionship. The leverage mechanisms in ex-post conditionality
relates to the interest of the conditionality recipient in upscal-
ing, continuing, or resuming beneﬁcial cooperation. In ex-post
political conditionality, democratic governance and respect for
human rights are objectives, whereas in ex-ante conditionality
they represent a precondition. 4
The second dimension of the typology relates to the quality
of the leverage mechanism, which can be both punitive and
restrictive (negative) or rewarding and incentivizing (positive).
Positive conditionality consists of the receipt of beneﬁts sub-
ject to the fulﬁllment of conditions, whereas negative condi-
tionality involves the reduction, suspension, or termination
of beneﬁts should the recipient no longer meet the conditions
(Fierro, 2003; Smith, 1998).
These two dimensions of political conditionality provide the
basis for an ideal–typical characterization of diﬀerent types of
political conditionality in diﬀerent external policies (Figure 1).
Zooming in on the four diﬀerent ﬁelds reveals the diﬀerences
in the intervention logic and leverage mechanisms of each type
of political conditionality.
Ex-ante/positive conditionality is considered by some as the
“authentic conditionality” (Fierro, 2003, p. 131), since
conditions, by deﬁnition, have to be imposed before entering
into an agreement or partnership (Selbervik, 1999). Ex-
ante/positive conditionality represents a strategy of “reinforce-
ment by reward” (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 670),
a cooperative approach following “an external incentives
model” (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 671) in whichthe conditionality actor makes certain beneﬁts contingent
upon the fulﬁllment of pre-determined conditions. In theory,
this type of political conditionality is meant to be “hands-oﬀ”
in the sense that no additional coercive inﬂuence is taken to
ensure compliance with the set conditions (Schimmelfennig
& Sedelmeier, 2004). Examples of ex-ante/positive condition-
ality include so-called “membership conditionality” (Kelley,
2004, p. 426), whereby institutions or organizations make
admission dependent on certain political (and often economic)
conditions (e.g., the EU, Mercosur, G8, the Council of Eur-
ope, or NATO). Another example of ex-ante, positive condi-
tionality is aid or trade selectivity, where suﬃcient levels of
democratic governance and respect for human rights are con-
sidered pre-conditions for more beneﬁcial aid or trade conces-
sions (Orbie & Tortell, 2009; Svensson, 1999; World Bank,
1998). An example of aid selectivity is the Millennium Chal-
lenge Corporation (MCC) 5 of the United States.
The mechanism of ex-ante/negative conditionality relates to
negative measures that are used to induce preferred outcomes
or political reforms before beneﬁts are granted or before
actors enter into a (contractual) relationship. Following
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004), this mechanism
reﬂects “reinforcement by punishment” (p. 4), meaning that
the costs of non-compliance are increased by imposing punish-
ment on the conditionality recipient. This punishment can
relate to negative measures taken in development, foreign, or
trade policy to inﬂuence outcomes in speciﬁc policy domains.
It can also include strong pressure in diplomatic realms or in
political dialogs.
The logic of ex-post/positive conditionality is that an incen-
tive mechanism is created where the size of the beneﬁt depends
on the level of performance and reform speed of conditionality
recipients. The diﬀerence to ex-ante/positive conditionality is
that the beneﬁt is not ﬁxed but dynamic and varies with the
actual performance which is assessed continuously, through-
out the course of a relationship or the use of a particular con-
ditionality instrument. In other words, democratic governance
is not a precondition in this type of political conditionality.
Rather, it is the objective, and recipients can start from very
diﬀerent levels of performance. Ex-post/positive conditionality
occurs mostly in relation to ﬁnancial beneﬁts, whereby the
amount of ﬁnancial assistance is (on a continuous basis) a
function of the reform performance stipulated. Examples
include the EU’s Governance Facility in its Neighborhood
Policy 2007–2013.
Ex-post/negative conditionality refers to the use of enforce-
ment and pressure – in the form of a reduction or suspension
of beneﬁts – to obtain desired political changes or reforms in
an ongoing relationship or during the course of an agreement.
The leverage mechanism consists of the (temporary) with-
drawal of beneﬁts in order to achieve compliance of the con-
ditionality recipient, that is, in most instances, the
government of a given country. Examples include the imposi-
tion of sanctions, 6 the temporary suspension of development
cooperation and of diplomatic or economic relationships, or
condemnation in international institutions and forums
(Fierro, 2003). 7
This general and simple conceptualization of the diﬀerent
ideal–typical types of political conditionality shows the diﬀer-
ent mechanisms and tools available to inﬂuence state behav-
ior. Such a conceptual understanding is necessary to shift
the focus from a narrow understanding of political condition-
ality – namely negative measures regarding foreign aid – to a
broader variety of diﬀerent incentive schemes and leverage
mechanisms in external relations. The introduced diversiﬁca-
tion of types and objectives of political conditionality and
Ex-ante Ex-post
Positive 
Negative  
- 
Conditions need to be fulfilled as a 
prerequisite to the granting of
benefits 
Reducing, suspending or terminating 
benefits during the course of a 
relationship 
Reducing or suspending benefits
before entering into beneficial 
cooperation or agreements 
Granting of additional benefits
conditioned on performance during the 
course of a relationship
Figure 1. Typology of political conditionality.
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if a speciﬁc example, in this case the EU, is included in the ana-
lysis.3. THE EU’S POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY
INSTRUMENTS BEYOND AID
Studying the EU as an example of the application of the
typology is a valid approach from two perspectives. First,
the EU has emphasized the promotion of democracy and
human rights in its external relations in consecutive treaty
and policy documents and is considered a key player in the
ﬁeld of political conditionality. 8 Some authors would even
go as far as portraying the EU as a “normative power” in
world politics, not least on account of its own history
(Manners, 2002). Second, the EU has (exclusive and shared)
competences over a wide range of external policies. It also
has legal obligations through the Treaty of Lisbon which sti-
pulates that all ﬁelds of external action should seek to advance
the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights
(Art. 10 A (1)). In a ﬁrst step, I brieﬂy trace the evolution of
political conditionality in the EU’s external relations to then
use the typology to identify the various types of political con-
ditionality the EU has in place.
(a) The evolution of political conditionality in the EU
The evolution of political conditionality in the EU exempli-
ﬁes the diversiﬁcation of political conditionality over the last
decade: from tying political conditions to EU membership,
the EU expanded its spectrum of conditionality to include
sanctioning aid recipients and using targeted sanctions in for-
eign policy and, more recently, to promote sustainable devel-
opment through trade agreements. The EU has a long
history of granting EU membership only to those countries
that can be considered “democratic.” 9 It took some time,
however, for the EU to also apply political conditionality in
its wider external relations with non-accession countries. An
important trigger occurred in 1977 when the then European
Community saw itself forced to react to a massacre in Uganda
– for the ﬁrst time, without any legal basis, it suspended pro-
mised aid funds (Bartels, 2009). But it was not until the end of
the Cold War that political conditionality emerged more sys-
tematically within the EU’s external relations, notably within
the framework of development cooperation (Portela, 2010).
In 1995, the EU created a legal basis by integrating a so-called
essential elements clause, including a “suspension mechanism”
(Bartels, 2008, p. 4), into all agreements with third countries.
This essential elements clause stipulated that respect forhuman rights and democratic principles formed the basis for
the agreement. 10
In the following years, the EU made use of the clause in
numerous instances, mainly in the form of aid suspensions
as a reaction to coup d’e´tats, election irregularities and gross
human rights violations, with the level of human rights viola-
tion being an important determinant for EU aid sanctions
(Hazelzet, 2005). 11 In 2000, with the coming into force of
the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the African,
Caribbean, and Paciﬁc Group of States (ACP), this focus of
political conditionality was exceptionally broadened by mak-
ing good governance – and thus issues such as corruption
and bribery – essential elements of the agreement (Hadﬁeld,
2007). More recently, and to the extent that the EU’s objec-
tives and policies with the developing world have gradually
diversiﬁed (Koch, 2012), the EU has also started to attach
political conditionalities to other external policies more sys-
tematically.
The ﬁrst oﬃcial EU policy on the use of foreign policy sanc-
tions in its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was
adopted in 2003, 12 even though the EU had applied “restric-
tive measures” – the preferred EU expression for sanctions – in
several cases since at least the 1980s. The EU has become a
very active player in the ﬁeld of foreign policy sanctions, with
empirical trends showing a signiﬁcant increase in recent years
(Lehne, 2012). According to the EU, 34 countries – of which
most are on the list of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance
Committee (OECD/DAC) as recipients of oﬃcial develop-
ment assistance – are currently subject to restrictive measures
by the EU. 13
In trade policy, the basic principles of a political condition-
ality approach had already been adopted in 1995, most nota-
bly in the EU’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP 14).
Here, the EU follows a “carrot and stick” conditionality
approach, in which the violation of human rights standards
leads to the withdrawal of trade preferences, whereas adher-
ence and compliance leads to more beneﬁcial trade conditions.
The launch of the “Global Europe Strategy” in 2006 envisaged
greater use of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) (Heydon &
Woolcock, 2009), a turn which was for the most part commer-
cially motivated. Given the resistance of many partner coun-
tries, most prominently India, to include political issues into
FTAs, the EU refrained from mandatory essential elements
clauses in FTAs but links FTAs to existing cooperation agree-
ments, which in most cases entail “essential elements claus-
es”. 15
The EU did, however, start to include social norms and
environmental standards more systematically and comprehen-
sively into its FTAs in an attempt “to develop the mutual
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cies” (Bossuyt, 2009, p. 708). This so-called step-change
(Bossuyt, 2009, p. 704) in the EU’s trade policy is aimed at
the integration of the decent work agenda into the broader
focus on sustainable development through the inclusion of
“sustainability chapters” in bilateral and regional FTAs. 16
This snapshot of the evolution of political conditionality
within the EU shows that the issues covered by a key actor
such as the EU have widened with accelerating globalization.
Over and above concerns for democratic governance and poli-
tical and civil rights, these issues increasingly include decent
work conditions and sustainable development. In the case of
the EU, this evolution also reﬂects several consecutive treaty
changes and the resulting gradual development of the EU into
a more comprehensive foreign policy actor.
The use of political conditionality thus increasingly goes
beyond a “narrow” focus on democratic governance issues:
[T]he Europeans have values as well as goods and services they would
like to export. These values include a developed sensitivity for the envi-
ronment, the rights of workers, and distributional justice. They form
part of an European model, if there is to be one.
[(Tsoukalis, 2003, p. 193)]
This widened agenda is also not exclusively promoted
through development policy, but through the EU’s external
relations more broadly conceived. The EU thus provides guid-
ing ideas on how much diversity there is with regard to politi-
cal conditionality and provides an interesting case for applying
the typology and further subdividing the ideal types of politi-
cal conditionality.
(b) The diﬀerent types of political conditionality in the EU
The main purpose of applying the typology to the EU is not
to analyze the EU’s implementation or the eﬀectiveness of dif-
ferent types of political conditionality (nor to derive state-
ments about the desirability of political conditionality in
external relations). Rather, the aim is to focus on the identiﬁ-
cation of diﬀerent types of EU political conditionality beyond
aid and to further specify the diﬀerent incentive structures and
leverage mechanisms developed in the ideal–typical typology.
There are various examples of ex-ante/positive condition-
ality, most notably in the EU’s accession, association, and
trade policies. The EU’s pre-accession conditionality is a
prominent example of ex-ante/positive conditionality. At the
heart of the accession conditionality policy lies an “external
incentives model” (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, p.
669): The adoption of democratic rules and standards, as laid
down in the Copenhagen criteria (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz,
2008), constitutes a prerequisite for EU membership. The
EU’s association agreements also include ex-ante/positive con-
ditionality. However, these agreements are less systematic and
stringent than pre-accession conditionality. 17
In both cases, ex-ante conditionality is related to the fulﬁll-
ment of (diﬀerent sets of) conditions as a prerequisite for the
ratiﬁcation of agreements. I therefore label this type of ex-an-
te/positive political conditionality pre-ratiﬁcation condition-
ality. Pre-ratiﬁcation conditionality is largely of a voluntary
nature: Countries know the conditions, they can choose to
apply for a speciﬁc agreement, and the initiation of the process
often comes as “a response to a previous request” (Fierro,
2003, p. 131) by applicant countries themselves.
There is, however, also another subtype of ex-ante/positive
conditionality which relates to the idea that beneﬁts are grant-
ed selectively, applying threshold criteria as a pre-condition
for the receipt of beneﬁts. Selectivity, as a concept, has itsorigins in the ﬁeld of foreign aid, where the idea of allocating
aid based on the governance performance of developing coun-
tries emerged in the 1990s (see Collier, Guillaumont,
Guillaumont, & Gunning, 1997; Svensson, 1999; World
Bank, 1998). The question of whether the EU provides aid
selectively, which would mean that better-performing coun-
tries receive more aid, is diﬃcult to answer. The EU does
not have any pronounced policy initiatives for which develop-
ing countries could apply, such as, for example, the MCC of
the United States. Moreover, research on EU aid allocation
is largely outdated. The few studies that exist with an explicit
focus on the EU show that democratic governance and human
rights played no substantial role as a pre-condition for the
EU’s aid allocation until the 2000s. These studies consider
the EU’s (economic and security) interests to be the dominant
motivations for EU aid allocation (see e.g., Wolf & Spoden,
2000; Zanger, 2000).
Nonetheless, the EU does make use of the idea of selectivity
in its trade policy. The EU’s GSP+ trade scheme, established
in 1991 and reformed in 2006 and again in 2012, represents a
“carrot” approach and oﬀers more favorable market access to
countries that qualify as economically “vulnerable” and that
ratify and implement 27 international conventions relating to
human and labor rights, the environment, and good gover-
nance 18 (Bartels, 2008; Orbie & Tortell, 2009). The diﬀerence
to pre-ratiﬁcation conditionality is that countries do not go
through a lengthy conditionality process to qualify for an
agreement (that is then irreversible), but are chosen selectively
according to their actual performance. Selectivity implies that
beneﬁts (ﬁnancial or trade conditions) are provided only to
countries that fulﬁll certain performance criteria and that the-
se beneﬁts can be withdrawn (ex-post) if these criteria are no
longer met (unlike under pre-ratiﬁcation conditionality). 19
The use of ex-ante/negative conditionality is not an explicit-
ly stated oﬃcial EU strategy, and it is documented sparsely in
the existing research. It mostly relates to political condition-
ality applied “behind closed doors”, in political dialogs and
negotiations of beneﬁcial agreements. Possible examples
include the withdrawal of already oﬀered cooperation instru-
ments (such as budget support or capacity building) or the
threat of withholding the actual beneﬁt. In the case of the
EU, the only mechanism documented in research relates to
informal pressure in the EU’s accession policy. Hughes,
Sass, and Gordon (2005), for example, stress the importance
to distinguish “between formal conditionality [. . .], and infor-
mal conditionality which includes the operational pressures
and recommendations applied by actors within the Commis-
sion [. . .]” (p. 526). Following this distinction, they argue that
the EU does make use of informal conditionality and exercises
additional pressure in its accession policy to reinforce desired
outcomes and reform steps before agreements are concluded
(Hughes et al., 2005, p. 525). This is conﬁrmed by Kacarska
(2012) who shows that the EU has used informal pressure to
get Macedonia to adopt legislation that protects the rights
of minorities. I label this type of political conditionality inten-
sifying conditionality, since additional (informal) measures are
taken to inﬂuence and “intensify” the existing formal condi-
tionality process. How systematic and widespread this use of
intensiﬁed conditionality is – especially beyond the EU’s acces-
sion policy – remains understudied.
The use of ex-post/positive conditionality, on the other
hand, is well established in the EU and used in a number of
external policies. In development policy, the EU’s Governance
Incentive Tranche (GIT) is a case in point. The GIT was estab-
lished in 2006 by the European Commission (see European
Commission, 2006, 2009) with the objective of promoting
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nal design of the instrument, ACP countries were oﬀered a
top-up of up to 30% of their initial country allocation, if they
subscribed to ambitious and credible political reform eﬀorts. I
refer to this type of political conditionality as incentivizing con-
ditionality, since positive measures, in this case ﬁnancial
rewards, are used to encourage better governance (European
Commission, 2009). The EU’s newly adopted “more for more”
approach in its Neighborhood Policy (European Commission
& European External Action Service, 2012, 2013), a follow-up
to the Governance Facility applied during 2007–13, is another
practical example of an attempt at incentivizing conditionality.
The basic idea of the “more for more” approach is that those
countries that introduce and implement more democratic
reforms will also receive more beneﬁts (beyond aid) from the
EU during the course of the relationship:
[O]nly those partners willing to embark on political reforms and to re-
spect the shared universal values of human rights, democracy and the
rule of law have been oﬀered the most rewarding aspects of the EU
policy, notably economic integration [. . .], mobility of people [. . .], as
well as greater EU ﬁnancial assistance.
[(European Commission & European External Action Service, 2012, p.
3)]
Even though the EU is often contrasted with the United
States as using mainly positive conditionality instruments
(Santiso, 2002; Schimmelfennig, 2008; Zalewski, 2004), the
use of ex-post/negative conditionality, i.e., “sanctioning condi-
tionality” – both in EU foreign and development policy – has
also become widespread since the 1970s (Bartels, 2008;
Hazelzet, 2005). Based on the essential elements clause inte-
grated into its cooperation agreements, the EU has made com-
prehensive use of aid suspensions and sanctions in its
development policy: “[T]he chief instrument applied by the
EU is the suspension of ﬁnancial aid and other forms of coop-
eration [. . .]” (Bartels, 2008, p. 11). Most prominent in this
respect is Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement which provides
for a consultation mechanism and the eventual application of
aid sanctions if no agreement can be reached during the con-
sultative period. 20 Outside of the Cotonou Agreement, the
EU has also suspended aid to Belarus (1996) and to Uzbek-
istan (2005) (Bartels, 2008). Moreover, the EU has applied
“informal” 21 aid sanctions to Russia (1999), Peru (2000),
Guatemala (1993), and to the Palestinian Authority (2006)
(Portela, 2010). In recent years, the EU has also started to
apply aid suspensions in the form of budget support suspen-
sions (Molenaers, 2012).
The use of sanctions also constitutes and important element
of the EU’s CFSP. These restrictive measures can be subdivid-
ed into diﬀerent types of measures 22 and applied for a number
of reasons: the ﬁght against terrorism, the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and to uphold the respect for
human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and good gover-
nance (Kreutz, 2005; Portela, 2010). The EU has also clearly
expressed that it favors the use of targeted sanctions 23 over
comprehensive economic sanctions.
The use of trade sanctions, on the other hand, appears to be
much more limited. The EU has made use of GSP sanctions,
or “downgrading,” in only three cases: Burma (1997, GSP),
Belarus (2007, GSP), and Sri Lanka (2010, GSP+ removal).
In all other cases, the EU has refrained from using its GSP sys-
tem to apply trade sanctions, even in cases where the Euro-
pean Parliament and civil society organizations have urged
the EU to do so (see Orbie, 2008). The 2013 events in Bangla-
desh after the collapse of the Rana Plaza building, however,
show that the EU does exercise pressure through its trade pol-
icy, even if it refrains from “formal” trade sanctions. In thecase of Bangladesh, the EU negotiated a compact that
demanded clear improvements and reform steps from the gov-
ernment in order to avoid being sanctioned. 24 In addition, the
EU’s reformed Neighborhood Policy also included elements of
negative conditionality. The opposite of the “more for more”
approach – which stipulates that better performers receive
more beneﬁts – is “less for less”: When neighboring countries
do not introduce and implement the political reforms request-
ed by the EU, they receive fewer instead of more beneﬁts.
The EU also has another subtype of ex-post/negative condi-
tionality in place, which exists in a gray area between condi-
tionality and social learning. In 2008 (with the signing of the
CARIFORUM EPA), the EU began to include sustainable
development chapters in its free trade agreements, calling on
the parties to promote and respect labor and environmental
standards. Sustainable development is not treated as an obli-
gation in itself, as there is no explicit mentioning of the possi-
bility to violate the principle. Furthermore, the sustainable
development chapters do not give either side the right to
enforce sustainable development provisions, with a suspension
of concessions and provisions in case of non-compliance ruled
out (Bartels, 2012; Van den Putte, Bossuyt, Orbie, & De Ville,
2013). Compared to the EU’s “essential elements clause”,
however, the sustainable development obligations are subject
to speciﬁc monitoring mechanisms which in most cases relate
to the convocation of governance and civil society consulta-
tions and, in case of non-satisfactory results, entail consulta-
tion of a panel of experts. 25 These monitoring mechanisms
provide only for soft dispute settlement mechanisms, empha-
sizing consultative measures and dialog and thus ex-post
mechanisms of social learning (Postnikov & Bastiaens,
2014). At the same time, there has been a debate on whether
social and environmental rights are fundamental rights and
thus whether they should come under the “essential elements
clause” (see Van den Putte et al., 2013). Given that most part-
ners that have entered into an FTA with the EU have also
signed a cooperation agreement that entails an “essential ele-
ments clause”, it is theoretically possible that a violation of
social and environmental rights would lead to a suspension
of the agreement, as there is signiﬁcant overlap between the
EU’s human rights clause and the provisions concerning labor
and environmental standards. In particular with regard to core
labor standards, the European Commission has stated that
these are also covered by the standard human rights clauses,
while also stating that the suspension of an FTA is considered
a measure of last resort.
The example of the EU reveals the variety of mechanisms
and multitude of political conditionality instruments across
diﬀerent external policies that have to be captured conceptual-
ly. This is interesting from two perspectives: First, political
conditionality has not lost relevance in the EU’s external rela-
tions. Rather, it has become a concept that is clearly used and
applied beyond development policy. Second, the nature, qual-
ity, objectives, and leverage mechanisms have become broader
and more diversiﬁed. Applying the ideal–typical typology of
political conditionality to the case of the EU thus allows iden-
tifying further subtypes and specifying the existing leverage
mechanisms and design of particular types of political condi-
tionality (see Figure 2).
So far, the focus of this paper has been twofold: ﬁrstly, to
conceptualize diﬀerent types of political conditionality across
diﬀerent policy ﬁelds in an ideal–typical typology; and second-
ly to apply this ideal–typical typology empirically to the case
of the EU. The last part of this paper will shift the focus from
the conceptualization of political conditionality to existing
research on EU political conditionality “beyond aid” and thus
Ex-ante Ex-post
Positive 
Negative 
Pre-ratification conditionality: Conditions 
need to be fulfilled as a prerequisite before 
the signing of accession or association 
agreements 
Selectivity: Rewards good performers with 
increased aid and better trade conditions 
based on pre-determined performance 
criteria 
Sanctioning conditionality: Reducing or 
suspending benefits to make countries 
comply with conditions during the course of 
a (contractual) relationship 
Oversight conditionality: the inclusion of 
sustainable development chapters in trade 
agreements that cater for the establishment 
of oversight mechanisms
Intensifying conditionality: A reduction of 
potential benefits or use of informal pressure 
before the signing of an agreement or before 
entering into a specific form of cooperation 
Incentivizing conditionality: Aims at 
incentivizing behavior by making the extent 
of benefits granted (aid, trade conditions, 
mobility agreements) contingent upon the 
level of performance and reform pace. 
Figure 2. Typology of EU political conditionality beyond aid.
A TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY BEYOND AID 103from conceptual aspects to gaps in the existing research. In the
following, the developed typology on EU political condition-
ality (Figure 2) will be used to guide a review on EU political
conditionality. The EU literature is thus part of the empirical
part of this paper. More speciﬁcally, I will attempt to answer
the following questions: How comprehensively has the existing
literature focused on the EU’s use of political conditionality
“beyond aid”? What are the existing gaps in the existing
research on political conditionality across policy ﬁelds? In
answering these questions, I will draw on diﬀerent strands of
research, notably the literature on political conditionality in
development, foreign, trade, and accession policy, and aim
to synthesize ﬁndings across these diﬀerent bodies of research.4. USING THE TYPOLOGY ON EU POLITICAL CON-
DITIONALITY TO IDENTIFY RESEARCH GAPS
A review of the existing literature on EU political condition-
ality in the light of the developed typology shows that diﬀerent
types are covered and analyzed to very diﬀerent extents. The
most developed strands of research focus on the EU’s use of
sanctioning conditionality in both aid and foreign policy and
the EU’s use of pre-ratiﬁcation conditionality in its accession
policy. In terms of sanctioning conditionality in development
policy, a strong focus on aid sanctions (mostly by EU member
states) emerged in the post-Cold War period during the 1990s
(see e.g., Crawford, 2001; Stokke, 1995). The EU’s (non-)
application of Article 96 has also attracted a great deal of
scholarly attention (see e.g., Bradley, 2005; Del Biondo,
2011; Fierro, 2003; Hazelzet, 2001; Hilpold, 2002; Holland,
2002; Portela, 2010). Comparatively little work has been done
on the EU’s use of budget support suspensions and, in par-
ticular, the EU’s use of informal aid sanctions (see e.g.,
Portela, 2010). Since the 2000s, academic attention has
increasingly turned to the EU’s sanctions policy in its CFSP
(see e.g., Brummer, 2009; de Vries, 2002; Eriksson, 2005;
Hufbauer & Oegg, 2003; Kreutz, 2005; Portela, 2010). In
addition, a vast body of literature has studied the EU’s use
of pre-ratiﬁcation conditionality in its enlargement process
(see e.g., Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2003; Schimmelfennig &
Scholtz, 2008; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, 2005;Schimmelfennig et al., 2003; Smith, 2003). It is notable that
most of the existing research has focused on the formal
conditionality process. In contrast, only a few studies draw
attention to the existence of informal conditionality (see e.g.,
Hughes et al., 2005; Kacarska, 2012).
The literature on the other types of political conditionality
appears to be rather thin. Research on ex-ante/positive condi-
tionality in the form of selectivity is reduced to a few studies,
both with regard to aid selectivity and GSP+. Most aid selec-
tivity studies focus on bilateral aid provided by EU member
states (e.g., Alesina & Weder, 2002; Berthe´lemy, 2006;
Neumayer, 2003), whereas comparatively little attention is
paid to aid administered by the European Commission (e.g.,
Carey, 2007; Wolf & Spoden, 2000; Zanger, 2000). There is
even less research on GSP+. The few existing works focus
on the compatibility of the GSP+ system with World Trade
Organization rules (e.g., Bartels, 2007) or the evolution of
GSP+ and the EU’s relationship with the International Labor
Organization (Orbie & Tortell, 2009). Ex-post/positive condi-
tionality has attracted some scholarly attention, for example
incentivizing conditionality in development policy and, more
speciﬁcally, the governance initiative (see e.g., Molenaers &
Nijs, 2009, 2011). Few works have so far analyzed the EU’s
human rights clauses in bilateral and regional trade agree-
ments (see e.g., Bartels, 2008; Hafner-Burton, 2005; Kryvoi,
2008). Similarly, there is only limited research on the inclusion
of labor standards in trade policy instruments (see e.g.,
Bossuyt, 2009; Orbie, 2011; Orbie & Kerremanns, 2009) and
on the inclusion of sustainable development chapters in free
trade agreements (see e.g., Correa, 2013; Van den Putte
et al., 2013).
Overall, the existing literature has focused largely on the
more “traditional” types of EU political conditionality, that
is, aid and foreign policy sanctions and accession condition-
ality. Research on positive types of EU political conditionality
other than accession conditionality is comparatively limited.
In addition, most of the existing research has focused on devel-
opment, foreign, and accession policy, whereas the EU’s use of
political conditionality in trade policy is still under-researched.
There is thus large potential for future research on the under-
studied types of EU political conditionality, namely: selectivity
in EU aid and trade, as well as intensifying, incentivizing, and
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Besides this potential arising from a future focus on so far
neglected types of political conditionality, there is also a great
need for more integrated studies on the diﬀerent types of EU
political conditionality.
So far, research on EU political conditionality has been con-
ducted in a rather disconnected fashion: Development
researchers focus on aid sanctions; foreign policy researchers
on CFSP sanctions; and enlargement researchers on accession
conditionality. Similarly, researchers interested in trade policy
have so far only rarely focused on the linkage of trade to non-
trade issues. This fragmented approach has resulted in very lit-
tle exchange and mutual learning between these diﬀerent
strands of literature and in insuﬃcient comparisons of diﬀer-
ent types of political conditionality. A strong focus in the lit-
erature on EU political conditionality, for example, has been
on the EU’s use and actual application of individual condi-
tionality instruments. The emphasis here is mainly on consis-
tency and the question whether the EU has made use of
either aid sanctions (Crawford, 2008; Del Biondo, 2011;
Hazelzet, 2005; Youngs, 2001) or foreign policy sanctions
(see e.g., Brummer, 2009) in a systematic and balanced man-
ner. By focusing on the application of speciﬁc types of condi-
tionality in a non-integrated and non-comparative manner, a
number of research questions remain largely understudied:
When and why does the EU apply a speciﬁc type of political
conditionality (and not another)? Are there countries or
regions where the EU prefers aid over foreign policy sanctions
and vice versa? Is there a gradual shift from development pol-
icy to foreign and trade policy as political levers, as countries
become less dependent on aid? Is there inter-institutional
exchange and debate over the right types of measures in a
given situation, or do diﬀerent EU institutions act and decide
independently in a compartmentalized manner?
Another main theme in the existing literature on EU political
conditionality centers on the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent types of
EU political conditionality in aid (see e.g., Bratton & van de
Walle, 1997; Portela, 2010; Smith, 1998), foreign policy (see
Kreutz, 2005; Portela, 2010), accession policy (e.g.,
Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2003; Schimmelfennig & Scholtz,
2008; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, 2005) and, to a les-
ser extent, in trade policy (Donno, 2012; Hafner-Burton, 2009).
Findings on the eﬀectiveness and on the conditions for eﬀective
political conditionality are, however, mostly limited to the indi-
vidual types of political conditionality. Research on the eﬀec-
tiveness of the EU’s accession conditionality, for instance, is
highly relevant for conditionality research in general but has
hardly been fed back into other strands of political condition-
ality research (see Schimmelfennig, 2009). Even though acces-
sion conditionality is a very speciﬁc, unprecedented type of
conditionality, it has provided a number of important theoreti-
cal and empirical contributions on the conditions under which
conditionality is eﬀective (see e.g., Grabbe, 1999; Moravcsik &
Vachudova, 2003; Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008;
Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, 2005; Schimmelfennig
et al., 2003; Smith, 2003). These insights could be built upon
by other strands of political conditionality research.
The same is true for research on the eﬀectiveness of sanc-
tioning conditionality. Although aid and foreign policy sanc-
tions research both study a form of political conditionality
with similar intervention logic, they are commonly analyzed
separately, with hardly any exchange between both strands
of research. Aid suspensions usually do not feature in the
mainstream sanctions literature, as they are considered to be
softer tools than foreign policy interventions (Portela, 2010).
One of the few studies that actually compares the diﬀerentsanctions of the EU in development, foreign, and trade policy,
Portela (2010), for example, ﬁnds Article 96 to be more suc-
cessful than CFSP or trade sanctions. Further research should
thus not only transfer lessons from the foreign policy to the
aid sanctions literature and vice versa, it should also study
sanctioning instruments collectively and focus on their interac-
tion and comparative advantages: What is known about the
relationship between aid and foreign policy sanctions? What
goals can be better achieved with aid suspensions as opposed
to foreign policy sanctions and vice versa? Are some regime
types more susceptible to foreign policy than to aid sanctions?
Are aid sanctions in general more successful than foreign pol-
icy sanctions, and if so, should they be used at all, given the
likely damage to developmental objectives?
This need to study diﬀerent conditionality instruments col-
lectively and comparatively not only applies to foreign policy
and aid sanctions. The few existing works on the eﬀectiveness
of essential elements clauses in development and trade agree-
ments draw interesting conclusions. Hafner-Burton (2009),
for example, highlights the potential of human rights clauses
in trade agreements to create incentives for at least some gov-
ernments to improve their human rights record by increasing
the costs for non-compliance. Donno (2012) ﬁnds that vul-
nerability to enforcement and dependence on the EU determi-
nes the eﬀectiveness of human rights clauses. She argues that
such clauses are modestly eﬀective in improving political free-
dom and physical integrity rights in those countries that heav-
ily depend on EU aid and trade. Recent evidence also suggests
that the EU’s approach to improving labor rights through
preferential trade agreements has a positive and statistically
signiﬁcant impact on workers’ rights (Postnikov & Bastiaens,
2014). It is thus important to study positive and negative mea-
sures in diﬀerent external policies both collectively and com-
paratively: Which leverage mechanism is most promising in
which country and problem context? When are cooperative
measures more suitable, and when are sanctions the best pos-
sible reaction?
Another striking feature of the existing body of research is
its lack of focus on political conditionality coherence. This
relates as much to the decision-making process and interaction
of diﬀerent actors at the EU level as to the intersection and
coherence of diﬀerent incentive structures in the targeted coun-
tries. The diversiﬁed use of political conditionality requires
greater focus on coherence at two levels: (i) between diﬀerent
conditionality instruments, and (ii) between political condi-
tionality and other policies. On both levels, very limited
research exists. Regarding coherence between conditionality
instruments, a recent article by Portela and Orbie (2014) con-
cludes that EU trade and foreign policy sanctions were coher-
ent in Myanmar and Belarus, but not in Sri Lanka, the latter
being a result of the EU’s institutional fragmentation. Bartels
(2008) conﬁrms the problem of institutional insulation of dif-
ferent EU bodies responsible for administering diﬀerent condi-
tionality policies, adding information about lack of
consistency regarding the standards of the EU’s diﬀerent con-
ditionality regimes. He also highlights lack of coherence
between diﬀerent external policies of the EU. Some policies,
for example the EU’s ﬁsheries agreements, do not provide
for human rights clauses or other political conditionality
instruments. The beneﬁts provided under these agreements
can easily undermine the incentives created by other instru-
ments that are intended to hold governments accountable
for their human rights performance (Bartels, 2008). The trade-
oﬀs between those policies that make use of political condi-
tionality and those that do not are likely to grow in the
future, with new areas of cooperation, such as ﬁnancial
A TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY BEYOND AID 105assistance for climate change adaptation and mitigation,
becoming increasingly important. If these policies do not
include human rights provisions, they are likely to nullify
the attempts at incentivizing human rights performance of
other policies. So far, the existing research has paid too little
attention to the coherence of political conditionality on both
levels, partly as a result of the conspicuous lack of exchange
between the diﬀerent bodies of research identiﬁed above.5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper set out to answer two questions: (i) How can
political conditionality be conceptualized to capture the var-
ious leverage mechanisms in diﬀerent external policies? (ii)
How do we need to study political conditionality in the
future, if we wish to draw greater attention to the diﬀerent
political conditionality instruments in diﬀerent external
policies?
Regarding the ﬁrst question, I argued that the conceptual
development and understanding of political conditionality –
traditionally narrow in scope in that it mainly covers negative
measures in aid – has not kept pace with the increasing com-
plexity of political conditionality instruments “beyond aid.”
The main argument of this paper is that a diversiﬁcation of
political conditionality has taken place, leading to diﬀerent
types and objectives of political conditionalities which have
to be integrated into the conceptualization of the phe-
nomenon. The example of the EU has served to illustrate
the evolving shift of the objectives of political conditionality
from an exclusive focus on political and civil rights to the sec-
ond and third generations of human rights, and concerns for
labor rights and sustainable development more broadly. It
has also served to identify a large variety of diﬀerent types
of political conditionality across diﬀerent policy ﬁelds.
Overall, the analysis shows that the concept of political con-
ditionality has not lost its relevance in an era when foreign aid
and traditional relationships between the developed and devel-
oping worlds are undergoing dramatic shifts. It also shows,
however, that political conditionality has to be conceptualized
diﬀerently in order to capture the various leverage mechanismsand objectives that have emerged in development policy, but
also in foreign, security, and trade policy.
This conceptual development process also has implications
for research on political conditionality. A brief overview of
the existing literature on diﬀerent types of EU political condi-
tionality has illustrated that research continues to focus main-
ly on the “traditional” types of political conditionality, leaving
open signiﬁcant potential notably for studying positive mea-
sures and the connection of trade policy to issues of human
rights. The largest gap in the literature, however, relates to
the division between diﬀerent bodies of research and lack of
transfer of theoretical and empirical insights from one strand
of research to another. By studying diﬀerent types of political
conditionalities separately, the potential for mutual learning
and more comprehensive theorizing of how and when diﬀerent
types of political conditionality work remains underdeveloped.
Most importantly, due to the gulf between diﬀerent condition-
ality research strands, very little is known about the interac-
tion of the various conditionality instruments. Are there
tradeoﬀs? Can diﬀerent instruments potentially undermine
each other? Does positive conditionality work better than
negative conditionality? If so, does its eﬀectiveness diﬀer
across diﬀerent country contexts and regime types? Is condi-
tionality more eﬀective if trade, aid, and foreign policy mea-
sures are applied jointly? Or is one instrument a suﬃcient
lever for change?
The example of the EU clearly shows that, so far, too little is
known about the extent to which the EU has developed con-
sistent and coherent political conditionality strategies in
response to the changed international landscape. In this new
landscape, developing countries are becoming more assertive
and have alternative partners as well as more domestic
resources allowing them to follow their own development
paths. Political conditionality has not yet disappeared, but
both researchers and policy makers will need to adopt an inte-
grative framework of political conditionality across policy
ﬁelds. Only by adopting such a holistic approach can they
assess the potential of the various instruments for promoting
the ambitious agenda of holding governments accountable
for their performance regarding democracy, human rights,
and sustainable development.NOTES1. For the purposes of this paper, the term “EU” is used to refer to the
policies administered by the EU institutions. In the case of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy, it refers to the intergovernmental structure
that guides the EU’s foreign policy. The focus of this paper does not
include bilateral policies and political conditionality applied by the EU’s
member states. However, given the EU’s supranational character, member
states do obviously inﬂuence the decision and policy making of the EU
Institutions through various channels (see e.g., Tallberg, 2002b).
2. The division of human rights into three generations goes back to
Vasak (1977). Following this division, the ﬁrst generation of human rights
refers to civil and political liberties, such as freedom from torture, freedom
of speech, religion, and press, etc. The second generation of human rights
refers to collective rights, such as the right to work and the right to social
security, codiﬁed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (1966). The third generation of human rights relates to the
1972 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment andDevelopment and includes the right to development, the right to peace, the
right to a healthy environment, and the right to intergenerational equity
(Vasak, 1977).
3. Linked to a constructivist logic, socialization processes emphasize the
transmission of international norms and global ideational structures
through persuasion and social learning (Checkel, 2001).
4. This general distinction into ex-ante and ex-post conditionality is
common. The understanding of ex-ante and ex-post is, however, diﬀerent
in particular disciplines and policy ﬁelds. In particular in the aid
community, ex-ante is commonly related to the disbursement of funds
before certain performance standards are met, based on commitments to
reform. In contrast, ex-post conditionality refers to the disbursement of
funds after results have been achieved (Adam, Chambas, Guillaumont,
Guillaumont Jeanneney, & Gunning, 2004; Collier, 1997; Koeberle,
Bedoya, Silarsky, & Verhegen, 2005). This logic, however, cannot easily
be transferred to other external policies.
106 WORLD DEVELOPMENT5. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was introduced by the
United States under the administration of President George W. Bush in
2004. The MCC is a performance-based allocation model, which releases
$5 billion per year to those countries that fulﬁll a catalog of 17 good
governance criteria.
6. Economic sanctions are foreign policy tools that use coercive
economic measures, such as trade embargoes, visa bans, and asset freezes
in order to achieve political goals (Portela, 2010). In development policy,
sanctions are used to pressure governments of developing countries to
pursue political reforms by threatening to withhold aid or by actually
suspending it (Stokke, 1995). In trade policy, sanctions refer to the
withdrawal of trade beneﬁts in order to force countries to comply with
their international obligations to respect human rights and core labor
standards (Zhou & Cuyvers, 2011).
7. It is important to note, however, that parties do not necessarily need a
legal agreement in order for ex-post/negative conditionality to be applied,
especially for the use of sanctions. Rather, elements of the political or
economic relationship between the parties such as the exchange of goods,
diplomatic ties, or ﬁnancial assistance are stopped or used as bargaining
chips.
8. According to Article 21 (1) of the Lisbon Treaty: “The Union’s action
on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have
inspired its own creation [. . .] and which it seeks to advance in the wider
world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the
principles of equality and solidarity and respect for the principles of the
UN Charter and international law.”
9. This is exempliﬁed by the rejection of Spain’s application to become
an EU member in 1962. In 1993, the EU’s accession policy was formalized
at the Copenhagen Summit, leading to the subsequent “Copenhagen
Criteria” which determine whether a country is eligible to become an EU
member. The Copenhagen Criteria require that a state has the institutions
to preserve democratic governance and human rights, has a functioning
market economy, and accepts the obligations and intent of the EU.
10. Since 1995, the EU has systematically included conditionality clauses
(so-called essential elements clauses) in most of its economic, partnership,
cooperation, and association agreements. The most comprehensive
agreement in this respect is the Cotonou Agreement between the EU
and ACP states which provides for dialog as well as suspension
mechanisms (Del Biondo, 2011). Essential element clauses are also
included in most of the EU’s association agreements and cooperation
agreements with countries in Latin America and Asia (for a detailed
overview, see Bartels, 2008).
11. Within this strong focus on civil and political rights, the EU reacted
most systematically to coup d’e´tats, which were followed consistently by
(temporary) aid suspensions (Del Biondo, 2011).
12. Council of the European Union (2003): “Guidelines on
Implementation and Evaluation of restrictive measures (sanctions) in the
framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy,” Doc 17464/
709.
13. See: http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf.
14. The EU’s Generalized System of Preferences includes three types of
agreements: the normal Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the
Everything But Arms initiative for least developed countries, and the
GSP+, which provides additional beneﬁts to countries that adhere to the
principles of sustainable development and good governance.15. The launch of the Global Europe Strategy instigated a discussion in
the Council on the inclusion of political clauses in bilateral agreements,
especially after India repeatedly objected to the inclusion of the essential
elements clause in the proposed EU-India FTA. The debate resulted in the
Council issuing new guidelines building on its 1995 decision, stating that
political clauses need to be included in a framework agreement (i.e.,
association agreement or partnership and cooperation agreement) and the
establishment of a legally binding link between an FTA and a framework
agreement is suﬃcient (Ahnlid, 2013, pp. 204–205).
16. This stronger focus on core labor standards in trade agreements
emerged as part of the EU’s commitment to promote the “social
dimension of globalization” in the beginning of the 2000s. In 2006, the
EU announced a “new generation of free trade agreements” with a
stronger focus on sustainable development.
17. Association agreements can have diﬀerent motivations such as
economic and political (Neighborhood), economic and developmental
(ACP), or commercial (Latin and Central America) (Woolcock, 2007).
Depending on these diﬀerences, some association agreements include clear
references to the Copenhagen Criteria, but these relate mostly to those
countries that have a potential to become EU members. Other agreements
focus more strongly on the free trade component and are thus less
stringent on a country’s democratic and human rights performance
(Fierro, 2003).
18. These trade preferences are currently granted to 10 countries; online:
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1006.
19. An example of a withdrawal of beneﬁts is the downgrading of Sri
Lanka from GSP+ to a normal GSP scheme in 2010, based on the
accusation of the use of forced labor (Castillejo, 2011).
20. Since 2001, the EU has initiated Article 96 in 13 cases (Cote d’Ivoire,
Liberia, Zimbabwe, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Togo,
Guinea-Conakry (2004 and 2009), Mauritania (2005 and 2008), Fiji,
Madagascar, and Niger). For a detailed overview of the application of
Article 96, see Portela (2010).
21. Informal, in this context, implies that the decisions for these aid
suspensions were not taken in the ACP, GSP, or CFSP frameworks, or in
any other legal framework. Some of them were announced by the Council,
others were handled discretely by the European Commission (Portela,
2010).
22. Arms embargoes, trade sanctions, ﬁnancial sanctions, ﬂight bans,
restriction of admission, diplomatic sanctions, boycotts of sport and
cultural events, suspension of cooperation (Kreutz, 2005, p. 5).
23. According to the EU: “Sanctions should be targeted in a way that has
maximum impact on those whose behavior we want to inﬂuence.
Targeting should reduce to the maximum extent possible any adverse
humanitarian eﬀects or unintended consequences for persons not targeted
or neighboring countries. Measures, such as arms embargoes, visa bans
and the freezing of funds are a way of achieving this.” (Council of the
European Union, 2004, p. 3).
24. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-667_en.htm.
25. In the case of the CARIFROUM EPA, there is a joint
CARIFORUM-EC Consultative Committee, which can also turn to
the ILO for advice. If no agreement is reached, a panel of experts is
consulted to examine the matter and to write a report with concrete
recommendations and proposals for next steps (Van den Putte et al.,
2013).
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